The Impact of the Second Trump-Kim Summit Deal-break on the Situation in Northeast Asia(本文翻自拙文「川金二會破局對東北亞局勢帶來的影響」，希望能將台灣的觀點與國際交流)
Doong, SyChi / Director for Foreign Policy Studies of Taiwan Thinktank
After the first Trump-Kim Summit, Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un announced four joint statements, including: improving U.S.-North Korea relationship, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration, and recovering the POW/MIA remains from the Korean War. These have largely been considered more of propaganda than an actual bilateral agreement. However, in the second Trump-Kim Summit, both parties discarded from such superficiality, and walked out on negotiation. It is clear that there was an encounter of disagreement during the negotiation, which both parties are not willing to make a concession on.
Both U.S and North Korea had issued conflicting accounts on the collapse of the summit though press conference. Trump believes that North Korea still has not yet disclosed many nuclear facilities and weapons, making it difficult to agree on complete sanctions relief for only dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex. The North Korean foreign minister, Ri Yong Ho, on the other hand, claims that North Korea had only demanded a partial relief of sanctions that “hampers the civilian economy and livelihood”, in return for the dismantling of nuclear facility at Yongbyon, but the U.S demanded for more. Even though the statements from two parties are contradicting, it is obvious that the differences in definition and intended procedure of ‘denuclearization’ are the main factors leading to a deal-break in the second Trump-Kim Summit.
Prior to the second Trump-Kim Summit, the international community expected that the second summit will lead to some forms of agreement or a more definite result compare to the first summit. Therefore the discussion was largely focused on whether a big deal (complete denuclearization in exchange for complete transformation on U.S.-North Korea relationship) or small deal (partial denuclearization in return for partial improvement on U.S.-North Korea relationship) will be made, and the impact of the outcome poses on the region. This also led to additional conversations on specific inter-relation developments, such as the normalization on U.S.-North Korea relationship (establish official diplomatic agency), building of peace regime (end-of-war declaration or peace treaty), and relax economic sanctions towards North Korea (provide humanitarian aid, relax or complete relief of economic sanctions). Almost no one had foreseen the ‘no deal’ outcome from the much anticipated second summit. Although President Trump continued to speak highly of North Korea and appeared to look forward to future discussion, the no-deal outcome had made issues surrounding North Korean nuclear weapons disarmament, such as the security of the Korean Peninsula and the situation changes of Northeast Asia relatively unpredictable. The no-deal outcome has great significance towards the surrounding countries in very different ways.
After the inauguration of President Trump, U.S has broken up the previous negotiation patterns of multilateral talks (Six-party talks) with countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula (U.S., Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia) by opening up direct conversation with North Korea through inter-Korean reconciliation. While the region are gradually addressing security issues through political talks, Japan and Russia become marginalized on the inter-Korean issue; the framework resolving the North Korean nuclear matter is built upon U.S.-North Korea-South Korea relationship with concession from China.
The no-deal outcome from the second Trump-Kim Summit, however, is a major relief towards Japan as they were concerned about the small deal outcome which is likely to sacrifice the Japan’s national security, and Trump’s firm stand towards denuclearization aligns with Japan’s need. On the other hand, the no-deal outcome has inflicted harm towards South Korea who supported and coordinated the U.S.-North Korea conversation. On the flight back to the U.S, Trump had exchanged conversation with South Korean president Moon Jae-In, which was expected to involve the outcome of the summit and possible U.S.-South Korea cooperation. However, due to the no-deal outcome, the meeting between South Korea and U.S. Special Representative for North Korea - Stephen Biegun in Hanoi was set back. At the same time, President Trump expressed in the press conference his unwillingness to conduct military exercises and his intention for allies to pay more on joint defense, which will also cause President Moon Jae-In to bear more domestic political pressure.
For China and Russia, that has been on the same side with North Korea traditionally, have both agreed on denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, with an inclusion of ‘Dual Track’ approach (the denuclearization of North Korea may take place in exchange for the suspension of large-scale U.S. military exercise or withdrawal of military from South Korea), and should be executed through multiple stages. Due to the fact that Russia still has unresolved major issues with the western world, they would hope to have more cooperation with Japan and South Korea in the Far East economy. Therefore, on the North Korea nuclear issue, Russia has been keeping its stand closer to China, but also maintains friendly economic relationship with South Korea and Japan.
China, on the other hand, has continued to promote denuclearization through providing intermediary assistance towards North Korea. This type of small deal can ensure China’s benefit, while preventing North Korea to become pro-America. Since President Trump stands firm on complete denuclearization in North Korea through the deal-break on the second summit, it becomes visible that the U.S. hopes to lead North Korea in the direction of the big deal to realize the ultimate goal of complete denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, the no-deal outcome has created pressure for China. While the U.S. views China as a strategic competitor, and the U.S.-China trade war continues, with North Korea unable to completely discard nuclear weapon in the moment, China inevitably will have to upgrade its effort on maintaining relationships with the United States and North Korea if they wish to prevent big deal from happening.
The heart of the matter still lies on the definition of ‘denuclearization’ and the approach conducted towards achieving it. The United States expects North Korea to show more sincerity by providing a dependable list of nuclear facilities, and at the same time pushes forward irreversible denuclearization; all of which are the basis for sanction relief. However, for a country like North Korea, who has constitutionally defined itself to be ‘pro-nuclear’, it is implausible to turn in the nuclear list that is vital to the country without sufficient and dependable security and economic compensation. At this moment, the dismantling of the nuclear facility and long range missile launcher show sincerity of North Korea in denuclearization, which is also why North Korea wishes the U.S. to display comparable sincerity through action to make denuclearization possible.
Although all parties claimed ‘complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula’ as the ideal and ultimate goal, all parties equally have standpoints that are difficult to change or must adhere to. However, if neither the U.S. nor North Korea is willing to make a concession on the matter, the deadlock will remain, and the regional situation cannot be improved. When all is said, will North Korea turn in a more complete nuclear list due to unbearable long-term sanction? Or will United States strive to receive more specific results on the Korean Peninsula topic, due to election or other political factors? In the end, perhaps “time” is indeed the key towards resolving the North Korea nuclear issue.
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